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Gratuitous Violence and the Rational Offender Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the 
rewards against the chances of apprehension and the penalty if caught. While evidence indicates that  
rational theory is applicable to acquisitive crimes, the explanatory power for gratuitous non-fatal violent 
offending has not been evaluated. Lottery-type questions elicited risk attitudes and time preferences from 
respondents in a street survey. Admitted violent behaviour was predictable on the basis of some of these 
responses. Consistent with the rational model, less risk averse and more impatient individuals were more 
liable to violence. Such people were also more likely to be victims of violence. In line with a ‘subjective’ 
version of the rational model, respondents with lower estimates of average violence conviction chances and 
of fines were more prone to be violent.  
 
JEL Classification: 
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth; 
K14 - Criminal Law;  
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1. Introduction 
 
If offenders are rationa l then they consider the associated costs and benefits before deciding to offend. 
Usually the costs include the chance of detection and punishment, combined with the value of the expected 
penalty. Against these would be weighed the benefits, the chance of securing material or psychic gains and 
the value of the expected payoffs. This simple ‘rational offender’ (Becker 1968 ; Erhlich 1973) or 
‘economic’ framework implies that changes to the likelihood of conviction or the size of punishment alter 
the incidence of crime. Less remarked upon, it also indicates that individuals’ attitudes to risk will influence 
the decision to offend, because crime is a type of gamble. Different risk appetites (and time preferences, 
when punishment is delayed) then should in part explain the distribution of offending in the population. 
 Criminological Routine Activity Theory (RAT) similarly looks at crime from the reasoning 
offender’s point of view (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson and Clark 1998). RAT postulates that a crime will 
only be committed if a likely offender believes a victim or target is suitable and a ‘capable guardian’ (such 
as a CCTV camera) is absent. The actual or potential offender’s assessment determines whether a crime will 
be committed. 
There is a great deal of international evidence supporting the broad outlines of this ‘rational’ 
approach. So the prospect of heavier prison sentences on Italian repeat offenders reduced the likelihood of 
re-offending (Drago et al 2009). US burglars target houses where they will more probably find richer 
pickings and with lower chances of detection (Shachmurove et al 2001). Even allowing for drug 
involvement, property crime in Germany is responsive to deterrence (Entorf and Winker 2008).  
The international association of greater national income inequality with higher homicide rates may 
well reflect the bigger payoffs of richer victims to poorer offenders with little to lose (Fajnzylber et al 
2002a). This interpretation presupposes homicide is in support of robbery or other material gain. But in 
some cases violence can itself be the purpose of the offence, rather than instrumental. Markowitz’s (2000) 
study of domestic violence included violence in the preferences of potential offenders.  
 Rational offending theory in the simplest version may be less appropriate for understanding 
gratuitous violence. Yet violent offending imposes considerable economic and social costs (Dubourg and 
Hamed, 2004).  Understanding the decision to assault a person should also suggest how deterrence and other 
interventions can reduce this crime. In Germany deterrence was found ineffective for violent crimes (Entorf 
and Winker 2008). One possibility is that perceptions diverge more from reality in the case of violent 
offending. Sah (1991) developed a rational model of the evolution of individual perceptions of punishment 
chances, but without formal empirical support. Recent advances in the behavioural sciences suggest that in 
practice, individuals appear to discount future events at rates which may lead them to act inconsistently or to 
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show lack of self-control; preferences may depend upon reference points so that individuals behave 
differently in the face of a possible loss from the mirror image of a comparable possible gain. They may also 
exhibited unwarranted optimism and make different choices in similar circumstances, simply because of the 
way the opportunities have been presented (Kahneman and Tversky 1979;  Lowenstein and Pralec 1992; 
DellaVigna 2009).  
Such behaviour could have implications for the explanatory power of a violent rational offender 
model, which we explore in this paper. The model may also require modification if offenders’ perceptions 
are influenced by drugs or alcohol. Victimisation and hospital data confirm a link between broad categories 
of violence and the price of alcohol in the US and the UK (Markowitz 2005; Matthews et al 2006). But these 
studies do not necessarily indicate that alcohol plays a direct role in violent offending, rather than, say, in 
selection of the victim. Certainly a natural experiment with zero-tolerance drink-driving legislation 
(Carpenter 2007) concluded that although, alcohol consumption was associated with nuisance and property 
crimes, it was not linked with crimes of violence in the US.  
Studying individual offending behaviour on the basis of attitudes, preferences and dispositions as 
well as environment, as rational offender models require, is usefully undertaken at the individual level.  
Offenders’ individual characteristics typically cannot be inferred accurately from those convicted (Maguire 
2007). Self-reporting surveys of offending therefore have a considerable advantage in this respect. Although 
there may be difficulties in persuading respondents to admit to crimes, or to a propensity to offend, even 
anonymously, this must be weighed against bias and under-reporting in police statistics. The present study 
of gratuitously violent city centre offending behaviour is therefore based upon a street survey. Crime 
prevention must consider the interaction between offenders and their victims, so a rational offender model is 
here supplemented with a model of the rational selection and self-selection of targets 
 In presenting the analytical framework for the study, Section 2 points out a contradiction for the 
basic rational offender (expected utility) model between the empirical evidence of risk attitudes and aspects 
of offending behaviour. It suggests how these might be resolved by comparatively recent findings from 
behavioral psychology.  Section 2 also examines the consequences for the rational offender model of how 
individuals actually discount time.  Section 3 specifies a testable model of rational gratuitous violence that 
addresses the anomalies discussed in section 2. The street survey that provides the data with which the 
model is tested is described next in section 4. Section 5 presents the results of the tests and elucidates the 
implications of the parameter values estimated. The concluding section (6) summarises the findings of the 
estimated model and touches on policy implications. 
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2. The Objective versus Subjective Rational Offender 
The simplest (expected utility, EU) theory of rational offending assumes that behaviour depends upon the 
objective likelihood of apprehension and the penalties if convicted of a crime.  Some of these full 
information or ‘objective’ rational offenders are therefore deterred from crime by higher penalties and 
higher probabilities of conviction. Other individuals do not need deterring because their preferences are such 
that their payoffs from successful offending (perhaps including the pleasures of violence) are zero or 
negative. In principle this could apply to gratuitous violence as much as to any other offending. Violent 
offending is then simply another choice under uncertainty or risk (Becker, 1968; Polinsky & Shavell, 2000).  
  
Risk Attitudes  
  A person who is risk averse would decline the offer of a fair gamble, such as a single toss of a coin 
determining an equal loss or gain depending on whether a head or a tail is obtained. Those who are less risk 
averse will be more inclined to undertake the gamble of offending, other things being equal. EU rational 
offending theory also predicts that risk averse offenders will respond more to a change in the punishment 
than to a change in the chances of detection; the elasticity of offending with respect to punishment is greater 
than with respect to detection or conviction (Appendix 1).  
Most people are risk averse, over gains. Although Dutch, German and Italian surveys (Cramer et al., 
2002; Diaz-Serrano and O’Neill, 2004; Dohmen et al., 2005) found substantial inter-personal variation in 
risk attitudes, only a small proportion of the sampled population were risk-preferers. Cramer et al. (2002) 
estimated that 1.39 percent of employees and 2.58 percent of entrepreneurs were risk preferers, Diaz-
Serrano and O’Neill (2004) found 6.5 percent were risk preferers in 1995 but  the percentage fell to 0.85 
percent in 2000. Dohmen et al. (2005) identified 9 percent as risk preferers. Since the proportion of 
offenders in Western populations is considerably higher, in England and Wales 41 percent of 10 to 65 year-
olds had committed at least one of the twenty core offences at some time in their lives (Budd and Sharp, 
2005), most offenders must be risk averse.   
But this contradicts a supposed empirical finding. Becker (1968) pointed out an observation, also 
confirmed subsequently (for instance with British aggregate data by Carr-Hill and Stern (1973) and for US 
college students by Nagin and Pogarsky (2003)), that estimates of the detection elasticity of offending are 
greater than those of the elasticity of punishment. According to the rational offending (EU) model, offenders 
must therefore be risk preferers, contrary to the implications of the survey evidence. Recent analysis of 
British offending yields ambiguous results on offending elasticities. Reilly and Witt (1996) observe their 
burglary elasticity estimates are consistent with risk aversion.  For residential burglaries Pudney et al. (2000) 
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find that the short run conviction elasticity is greater than sentence length and imprisonment rate elasticities, 
but that this result is reversed in the long run.  
A second difficulty with risk attitudes in EU theory concerns sentencing uncertainty.  If offenders are 
risk preferers as Becker maintained then sentencing uncertainty encourages offending, because offenders 
enjoy the gamble (Appendix 2). This seems less plausible than the risk averse case where sentencing 
uncertainty reduces offending. Sometimes ‘rational offender’ analysis has posited risk neutrality (e.g. 
Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 2002a). In this case there is no effect of uncertainty but it is 
difficult to square with the survey evidence of risk aversion and the pervasiveness of offending.  
Responses to these paradoxes include modifications of EU theory, for example by introducing state 
dependent or rank dependent utility (Neilsen and Winter, 1996). These alterations can allow the likelihood 
of detection to matter more than the weight of punishment for risk averse offenders. A lternatively, Polinsky 
and Shavell (2000) abandon the ’objective’ or full information EU approach. They note that substantial 
imperfect knowledge of probability of conviction and level of sanctions means that varying the average 
probabilities and punishment may have little effect. Sentencing variation simply induces a high ratio of noise 
to signal, concealing the signal.  
Another possible resolution, preferred here and based upon empirical evidence, is sought in the 
implications of psychological and behavioural research for the rational offender model. What matters is 
perceptions rather than actuality. Psychological theories of rational action, such as Prospect Theory, have 
drawn attention to general perceptual and framing biases that raise questions about the objective or full 
information approach to choice under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Hey and Orme, 1994; 
Moore et al. 2003). Prospect Theory indicates that individuals have different preferences over gains and 
losses; value functions then replace utility. Perceptions of probabilities are also systematically biased; people 
over-estimate small probabilities and under-estimate high. Decision weights substitute for objective 
probabilities.  
An individual’s reference point can cause a divergence from EU offender predictions. Dahlback 
(2004) illustrates the principle with tax evasion. If the state is regarded as unreasonably taking a person’s 
money then the decision to evade taxes may be made in the face of greater risk than choosing to acquire 
(non-tax) money illegally. An individual may then be risk preferring over losses, while risk averse over 
gains in this case.  
In short, Prospect Theory indicates that an individual can be risk-averse, risk neutral or risk 
preferring depending on whether choices involve gains or losses, and whether the chances of gains or losses 
are large or small. Risk preferring behaviour over losses and risk aversion for gains is a strong possibility. 
This could be sufficient to generate detection elasticities greater than punishment elasticities. A punishment 
is a loss, and a successful crime is a gain. An increase in punishment could have relatively little effect for an 
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individual who was  risk preferring over losses while an equivalent increasing in detection chances would 
substantially reduce the wellbeing from successfully offending, if they were risk averse over gains. The 
subjective approach to rational offending, or Prospect Theory as an instance of it, makes more sense of the 
empirical evidence.  
 
Time Preference 
Attitudes to time, or the degree of impatience, may also influence the reasoning of the potential 
offender. Individual time preference rates, particularly of deviant groups such as drug addicts, record very 
high discounting compared with what is conventionally assumed in economic modelling (e.g. Kirby et al. 
1999; Gomme, Kydland, and Rupert, 2001)1. When the penalty is time discounted in rational offending 
theory, the subjective valuation of the payoff from offending is larger relative to the future possible 
punishment.  So discounting has the same effect as a reduction in the penalty. The second prediction of 
interest here then follows; the probability of offending is greater the higher is the rate of time preference or 
impatience2.  
As with risky choices, empirical investigation has found possible inconsistencies in choices at 
different dates. Instead of the exponential, and therefo re time-consistent, discounting, individuals in practice 
discount hyperbolically (Loewenstein and Pralec, 1992). Whereas with exponential discounting, discount 
factors decline at a constant rate with futurity, with hyperbolic discounting the rate at which discount factors 
diminish declines with futurity, so that the steepest decline is in the immediate future. A consequence is that 
individuals are likely to make time inconsistent choices, unless they commit themselves in advance3. To 
make consistent goal directed choices – to be rational in the sense posited here - the person must choose to 
inhibit themselves, or exercise self-control, from a considered assessment of the benefits and costs of not 
adopting behavioural constraints. If they do not do so, then policy may need to impose constraints for them. 
                                                 
1 For comparison with Table 3 below, the implied 30 day  (hyperbolic) discount factors (for $50) were 0.57 for heroin addicts, 
0.72 for the controls and 0.83 for US undergraduates, reported in Kirby et al (1999). Even the last figure is higher than reported in 
Table 1, which may reflect cultural differences between Britain and the US. The annual  (hyperbolic) discount factor implied by 
the undergraduate choices is (1/(1+(.007*365))=)0.281 and the implied annual (exponential) discount rate is ((1/ 0.281)-1=)355 
percent This contrasts with the 6 percent real discount assumed by Gomme et al (2001). 
2 Nagin and Pogarsky (2004) found that only ‘poor impulse control’, not high discounting, predicted violent offending among 
respondents in the US National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health. ‘Impulsivity’ is often taken to mean that some people 
do not choose to act, they are impulsive. One interpretation is that they are inconsistent in their choices because they are too 
impatient to reflect and this impatience is different from the impatience measured by time preference. Someone could be too 
impatient to reflect on their action and yet in other spheres, such as spending and saving behaviour, exhibit low time preference 
behaviour. Even so it could be said that time preference and risk aversion differ between spheres. The important point for 
rationality is consistency within a sphere. The null hypothesis is random utility, where the constraint determines outcomes 
exclusively without intervention of preferences.  
3 An example of  hyperbolic discounting occurs when an individual prefers  £5 now to  £10 in one month’s time, and the same 
person prefers £10 in six months rather than  £5 in five months.   If first offered the second option, after the elapse of  
five months this individual would ‘change their mind’ about the initial choice. 
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3. Rational offender theory and inter-personal violence 
Perpetrating Violence 
While in principle, it is possible to distinguish between the offences of gratuitous (unprovoked) 
violence, instrumental violence – mugging for instance – and reactive violence (‘He hit me so I hit him’), for 
each in the fully rational model there will be an underlying preference for violence (Machlin, 2004). Those 
with the taste for violence are both more likely to react violently to provocation, and to find provocation 
where there is none (‘What are you looking at me for?’).There is a positive payoff to violence for a person 
with a taste for violence4. This approach differs from the modeling of Markowitz (2005) and Matthews et al 
(2006) where violence is an unintended byproduct of consuming alcohol.   They postulate that there is a 
violence production function or ‘structural equation’ in which alcohol consumption is a variable. 
Alcohol consumption is often implicated in gratuitous violence (Moore, Flajšlik, Rosin, and 
Marshall, 2008).  It may be a complement to violence in some individuals’ preference functions. Or instead, 
alcohol may shift preferences, reducing risk aversion (Lane et al. 2004), either way encouraging violence 
from those already inclined to it. When inhibitions are the commitment necessary to prevent time-
inconsistent behaviour by hyperbolic time discounters, alcohol may be consumed to release these 
constraints. Individuals choose whether to inhibit themselves, or exercise self-control, from a considered 
assessment of the benefits and costs of abandoning behavioural restrictions. Individuals might conclude 
there are advantages from dropping these inhibitions temporarily in certain times and places. Alcohol is then 
the instrument of rational action, where the agent takes into account the difficulty of switching inhibitions on 
and off.  
In each of the above behaviour patterns alcohol consumption is a positive influence upon violence. In 
contrast is the hypothesis that alcohol is an ‘innocent bystander’, correlated across persons with violence 
because of a third factor caus ing both alcohol and violence. Heavy drinkers are more impatient (Vuchinich 
and Simpson, 1998), which may imply that it is impatience rather than alcohol that triggers violence. There 
is indeed evidence that neuropsychological factors link strong time discounting with a propensity for 
violence (Coccaro and Siever, 2002; Lee and Coccaro, 2001; Rahman et al., 2001). Impatient people drink 
more and instigate more violence.  
In all cases there is an aggregate implied violence perpetration equation dependent upon prices, 
broadly defined, and wealth/ incomes, time preference and risk attitude. The ‘price’ of violence is the penalty 
if apprehended and the chances of conviction, actual or perceived. For given penalties and conviction 
chances, greater risk aversion reduces crime chances. Individuals with higher discount rates will find given 
                                                 
4 A taste for violence does not commit a person to violent behaviour any more than spectators of boxing or wrestling matches are 
committed to violent behaviour. 
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chances of detection and penalties less of a deterrent. Possibly alcohol consumption or the price of alcohol 
also enters the equation. 
A subjective rational offender approach replaces objective measures of the ‘price’ of violence in the 
above models. The EU model assumes an objective detection probability and the actual punishment, 
whereas an alternative is that the potential offender perceives or believes they take different values. In 
addition, this subjective approach suggests asymmetries over perceived gains and losses may matter, along 
with high rates of time discounting. Separate measures of time preference, loss aversion and risk aversion 
therefore should be included in the model. 
Those with higher wealth or income are likely to have more opportunities for achieving their ends 
and therefore be less likely to resort to violence. Their opportunity cost of a custodial sentence would be 
higher, but that of a given fine would be lower. In this study the proxy for wealth or low income is 
unemployed status. But it might instead or also reflect high leisure preference. Either way the unemployed 
have less to lose from a custodial sentence and, with little ability to pay fines, may be more prone to chose 
gratuitous violence, according to the rational theory.   
Where V is the probability of an individual’s violent behaviour, penalties (f) and detection chance p, 
W is wealth, A is alcohol consumption, r risk attitudes and i time preference rate, the individual violence 
choice equation is:    
V=h(p,f, A, W, r, i) 
Assuming higher values of the risk attitude index measure less risk aversion, the risk and alcohol 
consumption associations with violence should be positive. Measuring time preference by the reduced sum 
acceptable for early payment so that a smaller sum indicates greater impatience, the expected signs on time 
preference, penalties, detection chances, and wealth are negative.   
Victims of violence 
Aggregative studies of violence, looking at injury data, such as Matthews et al (2006), consider the 
consequences of offending behaviour rather than the behaviour itself. Of course instigators of violence need 
victims and studies of male youths show strong associations between violence, victimization and a range of 
problem behavior, including impulsive decision making and substance abuse (Farrington, 1998).  Moreover, 
victims are more likely to be male and to have past convictions ; 18 percent of 10 to 16 year old assault 
victims, and 40 percent of 17 to 24 year olds, in one study (Rivara, Shepherd, Farrington, Richmond, and 
Cannon, 1995). According to Jensen and Brownfield, (1986) violent offenders are more likely also to 
become victims of violent crime, putting themselves more frequently at risk by mixing with other offenders. 
On the other hand Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta (1999) contend that a positive correlation between 
victimization rates of violent crime and rates of offending is not based on behaviour but merely stems from 
both sets of people  living in the same area and possessing similar social and demographic characteristics. 
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Because of their social milieu, some individuals run a higher risk of becoming victims of violence. But there 
are not necessarily behavioral similarities with perpetrators of violence. Although there is a considerable 
overlap across victims and perpetrators of violence characteristics are not identical.  
Rational (pure) potential victims should minimize the probability of injury, subject to constraints and 
the achievement of other objectives. Risk attitude and time discounting may affect the willingness of 
potential victims to put themselves in the way of harm. And wealth could influence the type of recreational 
activities in which they engage and therefore their chances of victimization. Frequency of drinking in the 
city centre may be a measure of exposure to risk of gratuitous violence, as well as an alcohol consumption 
variable, in contrast to the perpetrator equation. Potential victims’ assessment of risk may be affected by 
alcohol. If alcohol consumption locations are high risk areas for violence then simply visiting them 
frequently will increase the chances of violent victimization, regardless of whether alcohol has affected risk 
minimization tactics. Risk assessment by potential victims may also depend upon experience, perhaps 
measured by their age (a). 
The individual’s victimization chances (T) equation is then:  
T=g(A,  W, r, i  ,a)  
As in the violence perpetration equation, the expected signs on risk attitude and alcohol consumption 
are positive. The coefficients on impatience (stronger time preference measured by greater willingness to 
accept a smaller sum, and by implication a larger discount), age and the wealth proxy should be negative. 
Individuals’ functions are aggregated across the population. The probability of the discrete events of 
being an offender or a victim is then modeled as a probit (or logit) relationship. Proximity (time and place) 
to violent offenders is a necessary condition of being a victim. So the disturbance terms of offender and 
victim equations should be correlated and the model to be tested and estimated is ; 
V=h(p, f,  A, W, r, i, e1)  
T=g(A, W, r, i, a, e2)  
 Corr(e1 e2)>0  
4. Data 
To test this two equation model of gratuitous violence, a sample was created of persons most likely to 
socialize in the city centre in the evenings, and therefore to have opportunities both for perpetrating 
gratuitous violence and to become victims.  Participants were recruited from an area of Cardiff densely 
populated with licensed premises in the late afternoon and early evening (up to 9 pm) on Thursdays, Fridays 
and Saturdays (days especially popular with drinkers).  Pedestrians were approached at random and asked if 
they would participate in a survey on at
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£100. 422 men and 428 women took part.  They then responded to questions from the interviewer who 
completed a paper survey5. 
A range of measures suggested by the theoretical discussion were collected. Eliciting whether a 
respondent was prone to violence was a delicate matter, even though the questionnaire was anonymous. A 
person who resorts to gratuitous or unwarranted violence will have a subjective reason or ‘provocation’. The 
definition of gratuitousness stems from a notional dispassionate observer. So the approach chosen was to ask 
whether interviewees had resorted to violence because of ‘provocation’ in the last 12 months. This is not the 
same as violence for defensive purposes (which might not constitute offending) or, strictly, violence to 
acquire something (which would). However a question was asked about in the last 12 months using or 
threatening violence to get something.  All those answering ‘yes’ to this question also answered in the 
affirmative to the first violence question.   Here we use only the answer to the ‘provocation’ question6.  The 
violence questions were asked towards the end of the survey. 
A few persons refused to answer these questions. This could suggest that omitting them from the 
analysis would under-estimate violence and bias conclusions. Therefore  some analysis is conducted of 
refusers and of  models that include refusers as if they had answered ‘yes’ to the violence question. There 
remains the possibility that some of those who answered in the negative, should truthfully have answered 
‘yes’. While this would affect the sample proportions allocated to each category, it should no more affect the 
parameter estimates of the propensity for violence than omitting ‘refusers’, for which we test.  
Victims of violence were identified by their answer to the question “in the past twelve months, has 
anyone been violent towards you for no reason?”  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. 3.3 percent of 
participants claimed to be prone to violence and more than twice the percentage (7.5) maintained they had 
been victims. 1.8 percent were both victims and perpetrators of violence. 
Risk attitude questions replicated those of a Dutch study (Donkers et al  2001). We were therefore 
able to compare our street sample results with this larger telephone survey and found they yielded broadly 
similar results. The exception was one question (Q4 below) involving large probabilities of small winnings. 
Fewer respondents in the current survey selected the  risky option (20 compared with 40 percent). 
Five risk questions were asked (Table 1). The first offered a (hypothetical) choice based on the toss 
of a coin:  
‘(a) you will receive £1,000 with either heads or tails or (b) with heads you receive £2,000, with tails you 
don't receive anything at all’.  
                                                 
5 The key questions are reproduced in Appendix 4. 
6 Since the purpose is to model violence which is probably criminal this is the best question we could devise that might elicit an 
honest answer.  Official data of recorded offenders and offences are almost certainly biased because they exclude those not 
successfully prosecuted and A&E data are likely to cover victims rather than perpetrators.   
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Those preferring option (a) were identified as risk averse or risk neutral and those preferring option 
(b) were classified as risk preferring or risk neutral. According to the answers to this question almost 85 
percent of the sample was risk averse or risk neutral (Table 1). 
 The second question allowed more precise discrimination of risk attitudes towards possible gains of 
quite large sums of money with small probabilities; participants were asked:  
‘Which of the following two options would you choose? (a) You draw a lottery ticket with a 2% chance to win £3,000, 
if you lose you don’t get anything. (b) You draw a lottery ticket with a 1% chance to win £6,000, if you lose you don’t 
get anything.’  
The sample split approximately equally between the two choices 
The third question introduced the possibility of losses from the choice. Participants were told: ‘We 
toss a coin once. Would you accept the following gamble? Heads, you win £1,500 but with Tails, you lose £1,000’.  
The sample proportion divide was 83 percent for the risk free and 17 percent for the risky choice, broadly 
comparable to the split  for question 1 where over a gain, 85 percent preferred the risk free choice. More 
than one half of those who were risk neutral or risk preferring (question 1) would not accept the risky option 
of Q3. This may indicate loss aversion among such respondents, for the expected value of the choice of Q3 
is positive. 
The fourth risk question  offered the following two options :  
‘(a) You draw a lottery ticket with a 80% chance to win £45, but if you lose you don’t get anything or (b) You win 
£30, no matter which ticket is drawn.’   
 Consistent with risk aversion, four out of five in the sample preferred the risk-free option, despite the high 
chance of winning half as much again with the risky choice. 
Respondents to the final risk question (Q5) were invited to choose between drawing a lottery ticket 
with a 25% chance to win £100, (if you lose you don’t get anything) and drawing a lottery ticket with a 20% 
chance to win £130, (again if you lose you don’t get anything). The virtually equal divide between the less 
and the more risky options indicated the differential levels of risk and return were too small to affect 
behaviour.  
For the time preference questions, participants were asked to imagine they had a lottery ticket that 
had won £87 but they would not receive the £87 immediately. Instead they must wait unless they sold the 
ticket for cash now. They were asked about the smallest sum of money, to the nearest pound, that they 
would sell the ticket for today if they must wait D days before claiming their prize. Values for D were 7, 30 
and 90 days. 
Respondents’ discounting was better described by a hyperbolic, rather than an exponential, function 
of time. Table 1 presents the discount factors from which implied 30 day discount factors can be calculated.  
On average £87 in 7 days was valued at £84.8, a discount of 2.5 percent or a discount factor of 0.975. For 30 
days at this 7 day rate the discount factor would be 0.97530/7. The 30 day discount factors are for seven days, 
0.90, thirty days, 0.94 and ninety days, 0.97.  These implied rates across the three time periods shows that as 
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the delay increases the discount factor and the rate of discount decreases; that is, discounting is hyperbolic 
(see also Table 3 below). 
 
TABLE 1 Survey descriptive statistics 
 Percent or mean  (SD) 
Violent Crime  
 Violent: 3.33% 
 Victim 7.85% 
Risk attitude  
 Q1 Risk averse or risk neutral 84.4% 
 Q2 Prefer more risky gain of larger substantial sum  47.0% 
 Q3 Risk averse over losses  83.2% 
 Q4 Risky choice with high probability 20.8% 
 Q5 Riskier choice small proportionate probability difference 50.4% 
Attitude to time  
 £87 in 7 days £84.80 (10.01) 
 £87 in 30 days £81.47 (13.77) 
 £87 in 90 days £78.33 (18.79) 
Crime: likelihood and  retribution  
 Estimated fine £234.7 (356) 
 Estimated probability of violence 2.42% 
 Estimated probability of arrest given violence 19.16% 
 Estimated probability of conviction given arrest 18.59% 
Drinking  
 Frequency of city centre drinking  
  Daily 0.45% 
  More than once a week 22.27% 
  Once a week 24.22% 
  Once every other week 10.91% 
  Once a month 18.83% 
  Less than once a month 23.32% 
  Drink problem 12.00% 
Age  
 Men 28.60 years (11.48) 
 Women 30.54 years (13.09) 
Male 49.65% 
Smoker 31.88% 
 
 In order to estimate whether victims or perpetrators of violence experienced systematic biases in 
perceptions of probabilities that might influence their choices, all respondents were asked to estimate crime 
likelihoods and retributions. Table 1 gives the mean values. Consistent with Prospect Theory, the risk of 
violence was overestimated (the objective figure is around 0.2 percent, see Appendix 3.)   
Again consistent with Prospect Theory, the probability of arrest given violence is also 
underestimated, assuming the combination of CCTV, A&E and police records used to estimate the objective 
rate cover all violent incidents (objective estimate 40 percent), as is the probability of conviction when 
arrested. The fine estimate is difficult to compare with an objective figure because of the way the official 
data are aggregated.  There is no variation in objective probability of detection or penalty recorded in the 
sample.  
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 Just under half of the sample went drinking in the city centre once a week or more. Historical alcohol 
drinking patterns were also determined by the answers to the question: 
 ‘In the last year, has a relative, friend, doctor or other health worker been concerned about your drinking or suggested 
you cut down?’ (‘Drink problem’). This was coded no=0 and all other answers including refusals =1. 
Other variables are traditionally associated with public violence –smoking, age, male, and 
unemployment. But along with heavy alcoholic drink consumption, most if not all of these variables are 
likely to reflect risk attitude (Donkers et al 2001) and time preference. So including them in a model that 
adequately measures these theoretical variables should be unnecessary. But insofar as the risk and time 
preference measures are imperfect, or they are associated in an offsetting fashion with smoking, drinking, 
gender and unemployment, the less theoretical variables will add to the explanatory power of the violence 
and victim model.  
5.  Results 
 A first test of the rational offender model for gratuitous violence is to see whether the variables 
deemed relevant by the theory are associated with violence. Violent persons are significantly more 
impatient, have lower estimates of conviction chances and of fines, higher drinking frequency, greater 
likelihood of problem drinking and are more likely to be unemployed (Table 2) They are more likely to be 
risk neutral or risk preferring as identified by answers to lottery-type question (Q1) in accordance with 
simple rational theory, but not significantly so. But those liable to violence are significantly less risk averse 
as measured by their answer to risk question 2. Also they are significantly more likely to choose the risky 
option in question 47.. 
TABLE 2 Violent versus non-violent and victims versus non-victims: 
 bivariate comparisons (means and t statistics). 
 Violence 
 Non-violent Violent t-statistic 
Risk preferring/neutral (Q1) 0.15 0.18 -0.48 
Relative risk low prob (Q2) 0.54 0.26 2.93** 
Loss Aversion (Q3) 0.16 0.18 -0.22 
Risk high probability (Q4) 0.20 0.37 -2.19* 
Risk small propn prob dif (Q5) 0.50 0.52 -0.17 
Time preference (7 day) 85.60 79.20 4.00** 
                                                 
7 Attitudes of those who declined to answer the violence question shows them significantly less risk averse on four questions, and 
more impatient, than the sample as a whole. 
 Violence  
 Non-Refusers  Refused 
Violent 
Question 
t-statistic 
Risk preferring/neutral (Q1)  0.15 0.36 -2.00* 
Relative risk low prob (Q2)  0.46 0.82 -2.33** 
Loss Aversion (Q3)  0.16 0.54 -3.38** 
Risk high probability (Q4) 0.20 0.54 -2.79** 
Risk small propn prob dif (Q5) 0.50 0.64 -0.81 
Time preference (7 day) 85.60 61.9 7.54** 
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Probability of arrest 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Probability of conviction 0.20 0.08 2.02* 
Estimated fine 230 100 1.70*  a 
Drink frequency 3.54 4.07 -2.53** 
Problem drinking 0.25 0.50 -2.49** 
Smoker 0.31 0.64 -3.78** 
Age 31.10 28.10 -1.21 
Unemployed 0.06 0.21 -3.04** 
 Victims  
 Non-victim Victim T 
Risk preferring/neutral (Q1) 0.15 0.19 -0.90 
Relative risk (Q2) 0.54 0.40 2.09* 
Loss Aversion (Q3) 0.16 0.26 -2.19* 
Risk high probability (Q4) 0.21 0.19 0.38 
Risk small propn prob dif (Q5) 0.50 0.51 -0.21 
Time preference (7 day) 85.4 81.9 2.85** 
Probability of arrest 0.20 0.21 -0.25 
Probability of conviction 0.20 0.17 0.71      
Estimated fine 226 207 0.45  a 
Drink frequency 3.53 4.03 -3.41** 
Problem drinking 0.24 0.47 -3.8** 
Smoker 0.30 0.48 -3.00** 
Age 31.4 25.8 3.31** 
Unemployed 0.07 0.14 -2.10* 
Notes: * =5%, ** =1%; a outlier > £2,000 removed   
 
Victims differ from violent individuals in that their estimated probability of conviction and estimated 
fine are similar to the sample as a whole. They are also significantly younger (t=3.31). They are more 
impatient than non-victims but not as impatient as violent persons. In some respects victims have similar 
risk attitudes to violent persons (Q2) and the divergence from the rest of the sample is significant at the 5 
percent level for Q2 and Q3.  Victims are apparently more loss averse than either perpetrators of violence or 
the sample as a whole (Q3). They are also more willing than the full sample to take risky choices for gain 
(Q2). Drink frequency and problem drinking distinguishes victims from the sample as a whole. Victims are 
not differentiated from the rest of the sample by higher education, although violent persons typically do not 
have degrees. 
Further analysis of time discounting factors shows that, for those who are violent, on average a 
reward in 90 days is worth only 77 percent of an immediate payoff (Table 3). By contrast the remainder of 
the sample reduces their value for the same delay to only 92 percent. In the violent group, the implied 
monthly discount factor for the first seven days delayed reward is very high at 67 percent. 
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TABLE 3 Time discounting factors grouped by violence 
 
 Non-violent * Violent * Implied 30 day 
factor 
(exponential) 
Non-violent 
Implied 30 day 
factor 
(exponential)  
Violent 
7day 0.98 0.91 0.93 0.67 
30 day 0.95 0.86 0.95 0.86 
90 day 0.92 0.77 0.97 0.91 
Note *(1-Discount)/£87 
 
Model estimates are constrained by non-responses to some questions, which can reduce the number 
of cases very substantially.  Consequently a general to specific modelling strategy, starting with all possible 
variables in the model, could be misleading. Instead we begin with a simple test of the rational offender 
model in which all participants know they face common penalties and detection chances and decide to be 
violent or not, or become victims, on the basis only of their risk and time attitudes (Table 4)8.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4  
Violence and Victim Risk Attitude and Time Preference Biprobits: Marginal Effects at Means     
 1a 
Violence 
1b Victim 2a 
Violence+refuse 
2b Victim 3a 
Violence 
Risk (Q2) 0.0320*** 
(3.15) 
0.03572**      
.(2.03) 
0.0461***      
(4.19) 
   0.0371** 
(2.10)      
0.0286*** 
(2.89) 
Risk  (Q4)  - - - - 0.0209** 
(2.12) 
Time 
preference 
-0.0007*** 
(3.02) 
-0.0014***      
.( -3.27) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.0013 ***     
.(-3.11) 
-0.0007** 
(3.08) 
Rho (SE) 0.69 (0.08)  chi2(1) =   
39.809 
0.64 (0.08)   chi2(1) =  36.87 0.71 (0.08)    
. chi2(1) =  
41.5149   
No. of  obs                                                  785 792 784 
Wald chi2      25.43 32.79 29.19 
Notes: Z statistics in parentheses. Constants estimated but not shown. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Eq 3b not 
reported because specification and results same as 1b. 
 
Table 4, estimated by seemingly unrelated biprobit, shows the marginal effects of greater risk and 
time preference on the chances of being violent or becoming a victim. Some of the predictions of the 
rational offender model are born out by this simple specification. Those who are less risk averse and more 
impatient are likely to be both perpetrators of violence and victims. In eq1a being less risk averse, according 
to Q2, increases violence chances by 3.2 percent compared with a sample absolute chance of 3.3 percent. 
                                                 
8 Rare Event Logit (King and Zeng 1999, 2001; Tomz, King and Zeng 1999) was used initially to estimate the violence and victim 
model because of the relatively small number of V, T =1 cases.  However the results were very similar to those from standard 
logit. Therefore because bivariate probit estimation is more efficient if the two equations’ residuals are correlated, this approach 
was preferred. 
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Every £1 discount on the £87 of the time preference question increases the violence risk by.07 percent and 
the victimisation risk by 0.14 percent, according to 1a and 1b.  
The correlation between the violence and victim equations (rho) is highly significant, justifying the 
biprobit specification. Two definitions of perpetrating violence are employed in Table 4. The first (eqs. 1) is 
simply the affirmative answer. The second also adds in those who refused to answer the question, slightly 
increasing the sample size. The violence equation with the second specification shows a greater 
responsiveness of this measure of violence to risk attitude, so that the difference in the risk coefficient is 
now significantly different from that of the Victim equation at the 2.8 percent level. Less risk aversion as 
measured by Q2 is associated with a 4.6 percent higher absolute chance of admitting to violence or refusing 
to answer the question. This is a large relative effect because the sample average for this category is only 4.5 
percent  The time preference or impatience effect is not much changed by the second definition and is not 
significantly different between perpetrators of violence and victims (although greater for this second group). 
Only one other risk measure was significant at the five percent level in the violence equation (with 
both dependent variable specifications). This was Q4 which offered a choice between a safe payoff and a 
high probability of a larger reward. Those who chose the safe prospect were 2.09 percent less likely to be 
violent, while slightly reducing the independent violence association of preferring the riskier option in the 
first question also to 2.86 percent (eq.3a). The question that allowed the risk of loss was not significant even 
for victims. There is then no evidence here of (prospect theory’s) differential response to possible loses 
compared with pure gains. 
Because refusal to answer the violence question was also linked to lack of answers to other 
questions, most fuller model specifications do not differ much between the two definitions of violence 
dependent variables. Subsequent modelling is therefore restricted to the simpler definition of violence. 
Fuller model specifications are tested and specified in Table 5. Answers to the relative risk question 
(Q2) (2 percent chance of £3000 preferred to 1 percent chance of £6000) continues to be a significant 
predictor of the violence propensity at the one percent level. A preference for the one percent chance, the 
riskier option, raised the likelihood of being violent or a victim by between two and three percent (eq1 and 
eq 5 table 9). Since the sample mean violence propensity is only 3.3 percent, and the victimization chances 
are 7.85 percent, this constitutes a large increase in relative risk.  
The time preference ‘marginal effect’ of -.0006 (equation 1a) indicates that a person who preferred 
£80 now to £87 in three months (an 8.7 percent three month rate9) was 0.42 percent more likely to be 
violent. High discounters, willing to accept only £40, increased their chances of being violent by 2.8 percent, 
                                                 
9 Discount factor= 0.9195=80/87, discount rate= (1/ discount factor)-1 
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by as much as those who chose the high risk option. Victims are even more impatient but not significantly 
so. 
 Even though the coefficients on problem drinking (not reported) are significant in the more 
parsimonious specifications, such as 1 in Table 5, the marginal effects at the mean are not significant at the 5 
percent level.   
Differences between risk and time preference coefficients of the two categories of persons were not 
significant, but age was a significant contributor to the victim category. A 30 year old has a 2.1 percent 
lower chance of becoming a victim than a twenty year old, according to the age coefficient in 1b – a 
substantial relative risk difference. 
The subjective value of the chances of conviction is significant and correctly signed but markedly 
reduces the sample size, and therefore also the significance of other variables. The marginal effect of -.06 
(equation 2a)  indicates that a 10 percent supposed higher chance of conviction is associated with a 0.6 
percent lower violence probability, consistent with a subjective version of the rational offender model. 
Similarly the fine estimate is significant and correctly signed in equation 4. The marginal effect indicates 
that a difference of £100 between  respondents in their estimates of the fine if convicted of city centre 
violence was associated with a 0.9 percent lower chance of being violent. 
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Table 5 Violence and Victims Biprobits: Marginal Effects at Means 
           
 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 
 Violent Victim Violent  Victim Violent Victim Violent Victim Violent Victim 
Rrisk (Q2) 0.0311*** 0.0371** 0.014 0.0521** 0.0171 0.0572** 0.0114 0.0612** 0.0192*** 0.0285* 
(2.70) (2.11) (1.31) (2.05) (1.36) (1.95) (1.35) (2.39) (2.55) (1.72) 
Time (90) -0.0006*** -0.0011*** -0.0006*** -0.0013** -0.0006 -0.0011* -0.0005** -0.0014** -0.0003** -0.001** 
 (-2.85) (-2.71) (-2.69) (-2.41) (-2.56) (-1.81) (-1.99) (-2.12) (-2.16) (-2.43) 
Drinkprob 0.0502* 0.071*   0.0254    0.027 0.0489 
 (1.87) (1.88)   (1.3)    (1.47) (1.49) 
Age  -0.0021***  -0.0027***  -0.002*  -0.0017*  -0.0019*** 
  (-3.00)  (-2.89)  (-1.67)  (-1.79)  (-2.79) 
Prob convict   -0.0585**  -0.0536      
   (-2.35)  (-1.97)      
Fine est       -0.00009*** 
 
   
      (-2.95)    
Drink freq     -0.0193**     
      (-2.12)     
Unemp         0.0298  
         (1.17)  
Smoke         0.0224** 0.0417** 
         (2.01) (2.10) 
Gender         -0.0235*** -0.0448*** 
         (-2.69) (-2.70) 
           
Wald chi2  41.55    26.95  30.21  28.6  58.04  
Biprobit  
correlation (rho) 
0.6735  0.89613  0.8932  0.87  0.639813  
SE rho 0.0859  0.0614  0.067  0.07  0.095669  
Obs 785  528  432  453  785  
Notes: Z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constants estimated but not shown 
 
Higher values of the risk exposure/ alcohol consumption variable drink frequency measure lower 
frequencies of city centre drinking visits. This variable reduces the effective sample size, but is significant 
and correctly signed in the victim equation.  
Increasing the explanatory variable set to include gender, smoking and unemployment status reduces 
the size of the risk and time preference effects, because some of these are captured by the additional 
variables. Being female reduces violence and victim chances by as much as smoking increases them; 
respectively by a little over 2 percent and 4 percent (equations 5a and 5b). Discrete changes in 
unemployment status at the other variable means is not a significant contributor to violence (or 
victimization, equation not reported), perhaps because it is a poor proxy for the theoretical variable, wealth. 
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A test of whether the determinants of the chance of being a victim or a violent person are different is 
if equality of all coefficients can be rejected across the two equations. In a specification for both equations 
with time preference, conviction chances, drink frequency, problem drinking, unemployment status, smoker, 
and male , a test of equality of the coefficients  yielded a significant result (?²(8) =  38.89, p < 0.001), 
indicating that it is unlikely that the same relations pertain equally to both groups. 
6. Conclusion 
Risk attitude, as measured by a lottery question, influences the chances of a person being 
gratuitously violent. This is a prediction of a rational offender model that represents crime as a choice under 
uncertainty, or a type of gamble. Lower risk aversion also increases the likelihood of becoming a victim of 
such violence. Again, consistent with a rational offender model, time preference is a significant determinant 
of gratuitous violence; more impatient people surveyed are more likely to be violent. Rational offenders 
heavily discount future consequences relative to the instant gratification of violence. The sample showed 
strong hyperbolic, rather than exponential, discounting. This implies that choices are likely to be time 
inconsistent; violent people are even more likely than others to take contradictory actions they come to 
regret, unless they make commitments - or commitments are made for them. 
In contrast to the simplest, full information, rational offender theory, the subjective approach predicts 
that perceptions of conviction probabilities and penalties influence offending. Violent persons surveyed are 
shown to have lower fine estimates and lower estimates of the probability of conviction,. These differences 
are in the direction implied by the subjective theory; individuals believing that the chances of punishment 
and the penalties are lower are more likely to offend.  
Possibly violent persons might already have acquired more information than others because of prior 
contact with the criminal justice system. If punishment is more lenient than most survey participants believe, 
as seems likely, then this is a possibility. But the reverse appears to be the case for the chances of 
punishment. Hence this experience argument against the subjective rational offender model does not seem 
cogent.  
Alcohol consumption is often association with violence. Although there is a bivariate association 
between ‘problem drinking’ and perpetrators of violence this does not carry over strongly to the multivariate 
analysis. On these grounds we conclude that impatient people drink alcohol heavily and impatient people are 
prone to violence but the alcohol does not significantly cause the violent behaviour. On the other hand, 
victims of violence are likely to be in the high frequency drinking category, which may measure reduced 
ability to assess risk, or simply risk exposure. That victims are more at risk the younger they are, is 
compatible with experience reducing the chances of avoiding danger. Or violent persons may simply prefer 
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to target younger victims. At the mean unemployment status, employed in this research as a measure of 
wealth, has no discrete change effect on violence chances. 
 A victim must come into contact with a violent person. The correlation of disturbance terms of the 
victim and violence equations found in the present study is consistent with opportunities for contact 
randomly distributed across the sample, and explicitly measured in the two equation model. Age is not 
relevant to the violence equation and estimated conviction chances are immaterial to the likelihood of 
becoming a victim, so the groups as a whole are different, despite overlap.  
In summary the simpler objective expected utility formulation of rational offending requires 
substantial modification to include time discounting and perceptions. But subject to this caveat, the rational 
offender model has significant explanatory power for gratuitous violence. A corollary is that policy for 
reducing gratuitous street vio lence that presupposes instigator rationality can hope to have some success. 
But a focus on changing perceptions of potential offenders may be more effective than objective alterations 
to the environment. The systematic perceptual biases about the chances of city centre violence and the 
probability of arrest of offenders, consistent with Prospect Theory, suggest considerable scope for such a 
strategy. 
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APPENDIX 1 Risk Aversion and relative elasticities of detection and penalty 
Consider an individual with wealth W and utility U, facing a penalty of cash equivalent f, of 
probability p and a successful payoff with money equivalent s, with a probability 1-p. Suppose the benefits 
of crime are kept regardless of being caught 
p.U(W-f +s)+(1-p)U(W+s)= EU 1 
¶EU/¶p = U(W-f+s) - U(W+s) < 0  and  ¶EU/¶f = - p. U’(W-f+s) < 0  
ep º (¶EU/¶p)(p/EU) = (p/EU)(U(W-f+s) - U(W+s))    
ef º(¶EU/¶f ) (f/EU)= - (f/EU)(p. U’(W-f+s)  
ef >ep if  
- (f. U’(W-f+s)) >( U(W-f+s - U(W+s))  or  
U’(W-f+s) >( U(W+s) - U(W-f+s)) /f  2 
The right hand side of Equation 2 is the increase in utility over the range of wealth given by the monetary 
equivalent of the penalty. Since U(W-f+s) < U(W+s), diminishing marginal utility (necessary for global risk 
aversion)  implies that that inequality ( that the elasticity of punishment e f is greater than the elasticity of 
conviction ep) holds, 
 
APPENDIX 2  Sentencing Uncertainty and Risk Attitude  
Consider an individual who is indifferent between offending with a penalty f of probability p and a 
successful payoff s with a probability 1-p. 
The expected utility where W is initial wealth is then 
p.u(W-f)+(1-p)(W+s)= U(W)  
Now suppose the penalty depends upon, say, in which court the offender appears and this is randomly 
determined. With a probability r the offender receives a penalty f1 and a penalty f2>f>f1 with a probability 
1-r. Expected utility is then 
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(1-r)p.u(W-f2)+rp.u(W-f1)+ (1-p)(W+s) =E(U(r))  
Suppose also that the expected value of the penalty is the same in both the random and the non-random 
cases. Then 
  W-f =(1-r)(W-f2)+r(W-f1)  
With risk aversion 
u(W-f) >(1-r)u(W-f2)+ru(W-f1)  
Without loss of generality set u(W-f2)=0 
p.u(W-f)>rp.u(W-f1)  
The expected utility of wealth with a certain penalty is greater than the expected utility with an uncertain 
penalty. Therefore 
U(W)>E(U(r))  
and there is less utility from offending under uncertainty. 
 
APPENDIX 3 The Offender’s Price of Violence 
The objective probabilities of arrest, conviction and the penalties for violence against the person in 
Central Cardiff on an average Saturday night were calculated with two data sets. One was collated by South 
Wales Police as part of the ‘Tackling Alcohol Related Street Crime’ (TASC) initiative (Maguire and 
Nettleton 2003). The other set, conviction data, was available from Home Office Sentencing Statistics.  
In 2004 approximately 40,000 people socialised in the city centre on a typical Saturday evening, 
giving rise to an average of 25 recorded incidents between the hours of 11pm and 3am.  Thus, for revellers 
in the city centre, there is apparently a very small chance of involvement in a violent incident on any 
Saturday night. How large that chance is depends on the average number involved in an incident. If two 
people were typically involved the probability for any person would be 50/40,000 or a 0.13 percent chance. 
If four people were involved on average the probability would be 0.26 percent.  TASC data suggests that the 
average number of people involved in an incident is 3.92 (SD = 3.25), placing our estimate at 0.20%.   
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Almost 40% of recorded violent or disorderly events in Cardiff city centre led to an arrest. An 
interpretation is that for perpetrators of street violence there is a probability of 40% that they will be 
arrested.  It should be noted that these probabilities are for one evening. A person who visits the City centre 
to socialise on 20 Saturday evenings a year, will have 20 times the probability of experiencing a violent 
incident in the course of the year – assuming each Saturday event is independent. However respondents 
were asked about only one evening ‘About 40,000 people will visit the Cardiff City Centre on a typical 
Saturday evening. Of these 40,000 how many people do you think will become victims of violent assault?’ 
APPENDIX 4 Selected Survey questions  
VIOLENCE 
Not 
used 
In the past twelve months, have you used or threatened violence to get 
something you want from another adult? For example to make someone to 
do something or give you something. (1)  
 
 Yes  1  
 No  2  
 Refused  3  
 
 
Used In the past twelve months, have you ever been violent towards someone 
because they provoked you in some way? (2)  
 
 
VICTIM 
 In the past twelve months, has anyone been violent towards you for no 
reason? (3)  
 
 Yes  1  
 No  2  
 Refused  3  
 
RISK 
You are probably familiar with games shown on television, where people win prizes and can choose between several 
options. For example, they can choose to keep a certain prize, or they can choose to take a chance to get a much bigger 
prize, at the risk of losing the prize all together. The following questions present similar choices, concerning amounts 
of money. Some of the amounts are certain for you to have, others you can win in a lottery. We would like to know 
which choice you would make. Please select either A or B in each. 
 
Q1 SHOWCARD 7   We toss a coin once. Which of the following two options 
would you choose? (4)  
 
A. You get £1,000 with either head or tails  1  
B. With heads you get £2,000, but with tails you don’t receive anything  2  
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Q2 SHOWCARD 6   Which of the following two options would you choose? (5)   
A. You draw a lottery ticket with a 2% chance to win £3,000, if you lose you don’t get anything  1 
 
B. You draw a lottery ticket with a 1% chance to win £6,000, if you lose you don’t get anything  2 
 
 
Q3 SHOWCARD 8   We toss a coin once. Would you accept the following 
gamble? Heads, you win £1,500 but with Tails, you lose £1,000 (6)  
 
A. Yes I would Gamble   1  
B. No I would not Gamble   2  
 
 
Q4 SHOWCARD 4   Which of the following two options would you choose? (7)   
A. You draw a lottery ticket with a 80% chance to win £45, but if you lose you don’t get anything  1 
 
B. You win £30, no matter which ticket is drawn  2  
 
 
Q5 SHOWCARD 5  Which of the following two options would you choose? (8)   
A. You draw a lottery ticket with a 25% chance to win £100, if you lose you don’t get anything  1 
 
B. You draw a lottery ticket with a 20% chance to win £130, if you lose you don’t get anything  2 
 
 
 
 
 
TIME PREFERENCE 
 
 
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS:  PLEASE READ 
We often make choices between a prize that we can get hold of immediately and a larger prize we can only get hold of 
at a later date. These questions will ask you to compare immediate and delayed options. 
 
Imagine you had a lottery ticket and had won £87 but would not receive the £87 immediately, instead you had to wait 
a while before you could cash in the winning ticket. 
 
A What is the least amount of money, to the nearest pound, you would sell the 
ticket for today if you had to wait 30 days before claiming your prize. 
  
 
 Don’t know 1 (9)   
 Wouldn’t sell 1 (10)   
     
£ Tens Units (11)  (12)   
 
B What is the least amount of money, to the nearest pound, you would sell the 
ticket for today if you had to wait 90 days before cla iming your prize. 
  
 
 Don’t know 1 (13)   
 Wouldn’t sell 1 (14)   
     
£ Tens Units (15)  (16)   
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C What is the least amount of money, to the nearest pound, you would sell the 
ticket for today if you had to wait 7 days before claiming your prize. 
  
 
 Don’t know 1 (17)   
 Wouldn’t sell 1 (18)   
     
£ Tens Units (19)  (20)   
 
ESTIMATED CHANCES OF CONVICTION 
 
 For every 1,000 people arrested for committing a violent crime in Cardiff City 
Centre. How many do you think are convicted in Court? 
  
 
 Don’t know 1 (21)   
     
ESTIMATED FINE 
 
 If someone is found guilty of an alcohol related violent crime, what do you 
think is the usual amount they are fined?  
 
 Don’t know 1 (22)   
     
 
ALCOHOL 
 
 Do you ever go for an alcoholic drink in Cardiff City Centre (23)   
 Yes  1  
 No  2  
 
 
 SHOWCARD 2   If yes, how often in the past 12 month, have you been for a 
drink in Cardiff City Centre? (24)  
 
A. Daily  1  
B. Once a week  2  
C. Once every other week  3  
D. Once a month  4  
E. Less than once a month  5  
F. Varies / Don’t know  6  
 
 
 
 In the last year, has a relative, friend, doctor or other health worker been 
concerned about your drinking or suggested you cut down? (25)  
 
 No  1  
 Yes, on one occasion  2  
 Yes, on more than one occasion  3  
 Refused  4  
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 How often do you have eight or more drinks on one occasion?  
(INTERVIEWER PLEASE INFORM RESPONDENT THAT ONE 
DRINK IS ½ A PINT OF BEER, A MEDIUM GLASS OF WINE OR 
ONE SHOT OF SPIRIT.) 
 (26)   
 
A. Never  1  
B. Less than monthly  2  
C. Monthly  3  
D. Weekly  4  
E. Daily / almost daily  5  
F. Varies / Don’t know  6  
 
